


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August 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: German Policy

I. General Consideration-The Problem of German Unification



The instability of Central Europe is not due to the failure of the U.S. to recognize the East German regime. It is inherent in the situation. The position of East Germany is different from

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as a result of this review.

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BY RMH NARS DATE 6/8 3/90


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that of the rest of the satellite Empire. In Germany a Communist regime has been established in only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical, ethnic or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole.

Moreover, there exists a free and prosperous West Germany which is the symbol of an alternative -- a condition different from that in any other satellite country. The East German regime will be driven by the logic of its situation to seek to undermine or to demoralize the Federal Republic. By the same token, no West German government can accept as permanent the partition of German territory without undermining its domestic support.




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Soviet and East German declarations leave no doubt that acceptance by the West of the status quo in Central Europe is conceived not as the end but the beginning of a process. They are always presented as a means to undermine the "militarists" and "industrialists" of the Federal Republic, i. e., its pro-Western orientation. To be sure, the USSR almost certainly does not have a detailed master plan to communize all of Germany immediately. It would settle for loosening the Federal Republic's Western ties and to radicalize its public life. It would then have the opportunity to play off Germany against its neighbors. It could appeal to German nationalism with the lure of unification, and to the other European countries through their fear of Germany.

For all these reasons, a wise Western policy will see to it that the Soviet Union is forced to bear the onus for the division of Germany. If the West understands its interests correctly it must stand for the unity of Germany despite the experiences of two world wars and despite the understandable fear of a revival of German truculence. The West may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but it cannot condone it. The division of Germany is almost certainly unavoidable, but the future cohesion of the North Atlantic Community depends on our ability to demonstrate what makes it so.

Western policy should have four goals:

- (1) to demonstrate to world opinion that the Soviet Union rejects even the most reasonable schemes for unification;
- (2) to appeal to reasonable people in the Soviet Union and the satellite bloc that there is an alternative route to security than the division of Germany;
- (3) to demonstrate to Western Germany that it cannot do better for itself through separate dealings

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with the East than through being a loyal ally of the West; and

(4) This last goal in turn has two prerequisites:

(a) that the Allies seem to take seriously one of West Germany's paramount concerns -- that of unification, and

(b) that they give the Federal Republic an increasing stake in a larger framework than that of Germany, specifically, the Atlantic Community.

The attitude towards Eastern Germany is of importance also in our dealings with the Soviet Bloc. If the USSR can force us to give up the principle of self-determination in an area where our moral and legal position is unassailable, we will have demonstrated that we may accede to any fait accompli. Given the Communist mentality, this is more likely than not to set up a pattern of blackmail in other areas.

A plan for Central Europe should, therefore, have the following features:

(1) It should seek to offer a means towards the unification of Germany on the basis of some scheme of self-determination;

(2) It should seek to take account of legitimate Soviet security concerns. Reasonable men in the Soviet hierarchy should be able to come to the conclusion that their security can be safeguarded without enslaving 17 million people;

(3) It should reassure the East European countries about their present territorial extent. Specifically, Poland and Czechoslovakia should be given to understand that support for the Soviet Berlin policy is not required to safeguard their frontiers; and

(4) If the West settles for the status quo it should make clear that it does so not by preference but because it prefers the status quo to nuclear war.


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Henry Kissinger

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